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Ali M. Rizvi* 
 
Biopower, Governmentality, and Capitalism through the Lenses of 
Freedom: A Conceptual Enquiry 
 
Abstract: In this paper I propose a framework to understand the transition in Foucault’s work from the 
disciplinary  model  to  the  governmentality  model.  Foucault’s  work  on  power  emerges  within  the 
general context of an expression of capitalist rationality and the nature of freedom and power within 
it. I argue that, thus understood, Foucault’s transition to the governmentality model can be seen 
simultaneously  as  a  deepening  recognition  of  what  capitalism  is  and  how  it  works,  but  also  the 
recognition of the changing historical nature of the actually existing capitalisms and their specifically 
situated  historical  needs.  I  then  argue  that  the  disciplinary  model  should  be  understood  as  a 
contingent response to the demands of early capitalism, and argue that with the maturation of the 
capitalist enterprise many of those responses no longer are necessary. New realities require new 
responses; although this does not necessarily result in the abandonment of the earlier disciplinary 
model,  it  does  require  their  reconfiguration  according  to  the  changed  situation  and  the  new 
imperatives following from it.  
Keywords:  Foucault,  Capitalism,  Freedom,  Power,  Disciplines,  Governmentality,  Biopower, 
Population 
 
There is a theme running throughout Foucault’s analyses of governmentality, biopower, the 
changing  nature  of  state  and  its  relation  to  society,  and  neo-liberalism.  The  theme  is 
particularly  clear  in  the  contrasts  he  makes  between  governmentality  and  the  arts  of 
government in previous centuries (the reason of state and the theory of police, etc.), biopower 
versus disciplinary power, and the modern state versus the early modern state (and medieval 
state). The theme is that of freedom, the nature of freedom, and its relation to other notions 
such as power, rationality etc. Foucault wants to reject a certain notion of freedom. Let us call 
it a negative notion of freedom, which sees it in terms of the absence of something else, 
something  it  is  not:  A  way  out.
1  Specifically, negative freedom is seen as  absence of 
repression and domination, notions that are in turn associated with  power. Hence, negative 
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1 Foucault’s most sustained critique of the notion of freedom as a ‘way out’ is developed in terms of his critique 
of the so called repressive hypothesis, which also implies that the notion of freedom as a way out is intimately 
related to a negative notion of power in which power is regarded as domination and as absence of freedom 
(Michel  Foucault,  The  History  of  Sexuality  Vol.  1:  An  Introduction,  1981,  17-49;  also  see  Nicholas  Rose,. 
Towards a Critical Sociology of Freedom, Inaugural Lecture delivered on 5 May 1992 at Goldsmith College, 
University of London, Goldsmiths College Occasional Paper, 1993). 2 
freedom becomes absence of power, and the way to freedom is a way out of power relations. 
In this view, power is domination. The assumption is that where there is power there is no 
freedom,  and  where  there  is  freedom  there  is  no  power.  Let’s  call  this  the  ‘exclusory’ 
hypothesis;
2 power and freedom, according to this hypothesis, are mutually exclusive. But 
this, Foucault argues, is to misunderstand the nature of modern freedom and power, and the 
way they operate in modern societies. Such notions of freedom and power might have some 
relevance  to  early  modern  and  medieval  societies,  but  they  are  quite  inadequate  in 
understanding our contemporary societies.
3  
One of the insights of the analysis is that freedom is a great managing power (an d not 
just a liberating force), and power is not necessarily something bad (it can lead to either 
domination  or  freedom).  Freedom,  and  a  particular  positive  notion  of  freedom,  is  the 
paradigm of the new techniques of government, the new art of government. Freedom is meant 
here not as an ideology (although that is important as well, even though much less important 
than is normally thought), but simultaneously as the principle (mechanism) through which the 
system works. Freedom in this sense is not to be understood primarily as the property of will 
(in the tradition of human rights and legal discourses), but as the freedom of movement and 
freedom of circulation – freedom to develop, grow, enhance – and is applied to both people 
and things (that is both to physical and human capital). The new art of government is not 
primarily based on prohibitions and exclusions, but is “carried out through and by reliance on 
freedom of each”.
4  
Now,  Foucault’s  studies  into  the  nature  of  biopower  and  governmental  rationality, 
although evidently connected to the phenomenon of capitalism, were carried out in relative 
isolation and without explicit attention to the concept of capitalism. This was so for at least 
three reasons: First, Foucault, from a methodological viewpoint, wishes to avoid universals.
5 
His method explicitly concentrates on understanding different practices and rationalities 
involved in them. Second, he wants to eschew concentration on the concept of capitalism for 
strategic reasons: Foucault once said that “experience has taught me that the history of various 
forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism 
                                                           
2 As  noted above, the acceptance of the ‘exclusory’ hypothesis is part and parcel of the acceptance of the 
repressive hypothesis. 
3 For Foucault’s critique of the negative conception of power, and its inadequacy for understanding modern 
capitalism and his critique of legalistic models in general, see Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 85-91 
and 136-139. 
4 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, ed. Arnold I. 
Davidson, 2007, 49. 
5  Michel Foucault.  The  Birth  of  Biopolitics:  Lectures  at  the  College  de  France,  1978-1979,  ed.  Arnold  I. 
Davidson,  2008,  2-3;  Foucault,  Security,  Territory,  Population,  118;  Michel  Foucault,  Essential  Works  of 
Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, 1998, 461. 3 
than is abstract criticism. For centuries, religion couldn’t bear having its history told. Today, 
our schools of rationality balk at having their history written, which is no doubt significant”.
6 
Similarly, it seems to me that Foucault prefers to disrupt certain assumptions about capitalism 
through historical  investigation into different  forms of powers and their genealogy in  the 
West, rather than through direct conceptual analysis of it. Third, Foucault stresses the need to 
understand the phenomenon one is studying in its specificity; it involves, among other things, 
understanding  things/objects/concepts  in  their  own  terms  (paying  utmost  attention  to 
differences),  which  in  turn  requires  paying  close  attention  to  the  particularity  of  the 
phenomenon under consideration.
7 Referring to universal terms like ‘capitalism’ blurs the 
crucial particularity of a specific form of economy. There is no ‘Capitalism’ with a capital ‘C’ 
for Foucault.
8 But it would be wrong to infer from this that one cannot talk about capitalism in 
general.  Generality  should  not  be  confused  with  universality;  generality  can  respect 
specificity in a way tha t universality cannot. Therefore, it would be wrong to infer from 
Foucault’s insistence on studying specific ‘capitalisms’ in their own right that we cannot learn 
some  general  ‘truths’  about  capitalism.    In  this  paper  I  will  step  aside  from  issues  of 
interpretation and try to investigate the conceptual advances made by Foucault’s analyses, 
how some of his conceptual tools can be used in understanding capitalist rationality, and how 
this rationality can help deconstruct certain traditional myths about capitalism.
9   
Freedom  and  power  are  two  important  elements  around  which  Foucault’s  analysis 
revolves; however, power is the explicit object, while freedom (at least until his later writings) 
remains a background condition of power. Freedom is not only presupposed by the sort of 
power  Foucault  is  interested  in  analysing,  it  is  also  its  positive  mechanism:  “[P]ower  is 
exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free”.
10  Foucault is not after a 
theory of power. Nor is he interested in discovering the essence of power. His investigations 
are aimed at discovering the defining features of specific forms of power he has studied in his 
different projects. But: a) The fact that Foucault studies specific forms of power does not 
mean that he is not interested in general features of power; b) in general, denying that one is 
                                                           
6 Michel Foucault, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 3: Power, ed. James D. Faubion, 2002, 323. 
7 For some very suggestive comments on this, see Foucault,  The Birth of Biopolitics, 187-188. Foucault here 
takes to task different critiques of the state that do not respect the “specificity of analysis” (188). 
8 Ibid., 164, 174. Foucault rejects the Marxist notion of a single (economic) logic of capital primarily because for 
him capitalism is not merely or even primarily an economic phenomenon but a political one, which, although it 
has its own singularity, does not have any deterministic logic; as a politica l phenomenon it opens up a field of 
possibility which takes many different forms, for example, according to the specific historical situation and the 
political will of the actors involved.  
9 Although the latter is not the explicit aim of my paper, it will rather only be implied by my analysis; the explicit 
articulation will have to wait for another occasion. 
10 Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in:  Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. 
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 1983, 221, emphasis added. 4 
interested in a theory of power does not mean one is not interested in general features of 
power. Power is a relational concept. It is something that arises out of human relations. Power 
presupposes materiality (force for example), but is not reducible to it. Power is not force. 
Force  is  something  physical;  power  is  a  social  (or,  to  be  more  precise  societal)  notion. 
Physical force might play a role in a particular power relation; it does not define power, or 
even  forms,  generally  speaking,  its  essential  feature.  Power  is  an  aspect  of  any  relation 
between two, or more than two, human beings (in fact even a relation of self to itself involves 
power, and a crucial topic of investigation in Foucault’s later writings). The particular form 
power takes depends on a type of relation, the purpose of a relation, and other related factors. 
For example, friendships, love, and family are all relations, but they presuppose different 
types  of power and different  strategies  and techniques of power. Power involved in  love 
relations, for example, cannot be understood using the model of power involved in economic 
relations. Power and domination are obviously related concepts. Domination is related to the 
ends (telos) of power, but domination cannot be regarded as essential to all forms of power 
without compromising the specificity of different forms of power.
11  It would be odd, for 
example, to say that the purpose of love relation is domination (even though such a r elation 
may give one person potential dominance over the other, which may or may not be exploited 
by the possessor of such a power).
12  
There  are  various  instruments  and  preconditions  of  power  relations,  viz.  freedom, 
knowledge, charisma, and charm,
13 to mention a few. Let us suppose I want to control your 
life; the question can arise only if you are free and only to the extent that you are free; if you 
are not free (e.g. if you are chained, or are enslaved),
14 I do not need to control your activities. 
In this specific sense, freedom is the general condition of any power relation, and it is also a 
general condition of governance. Similarly, knowledge of the object/person one wants to 
govern also seems to be a general condition of power relations as well  as governance. 
                                                           
11  What  Foucault  rejects  is  the  simplistic  notion  of  domination  according  to  which  domination  is  almost 
epiphenomenal to, if not the necessary effect of, all forms of power, and absence of domination is equivalent to 
freedom  and  liberation.  Foucault  also  wants  to  differentiate  between  different  forms  of  domination  and 
understand them in their specificity. Typical form of capitalistic domination (at least in mature capitalism), for 
Foucault,  is  subjection  (Foucault,  The  Subject  and  Power,  212),  which  is  quite  different  from  domination 
understood as “appropriation of bodies” (Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1978, 
137).  
12 For a detailed discussion of Foucault’s notion of domination and its relation to other forms of repression, see 
Ali Rizvi, Towards Theorising Post Modern Activism: A Foucauldian Perspective, Market Forces 3, 1 (2007), 
56-64. 
13 A recent book on Stalin describes his influence within the communist party as follows: “The foundation of 
Stalin’s power in the Party was not fear: it was charm” (Simon S. Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, 
2004, 49). 
14 Servitude is a “constant, total, massive, non analytical, unlimited relationship of domination established in the 
form of the individual will of the master, his ‘caprice’” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137). Slavery on the 
other hand involves (requires) “appropriation of bodies” (ibid.).  5 
However, the active, positive role of freedom, as well as knowledge, beyond this minimal 
sense changes depending on the nature of power involved, the specific object of governance, 
etc. Now, if you are free, and if I need to control your activities (and control may or may not 
involve repression), I need to have some sort of power over you. I need to have a certain 
strategy in place to govern, restrict, and streamline (depending on the context) your (possible) 
actions. Various factors can influence such strategies. If, for example, my purpose is just that 
you do not become too powerful relative to me, then my purpose is entirely negative. I have 
no positive interest in managing your life (or at least, only to the point that it is necessary for 
the negative purpose of stopping you from usurping my privileges). My interest in positively 
governing you (restricting, managing your actions or conduct) exists only to the extent that it 
is related to the negative task of limiting your power over me. On the other hand, if my 
interest in governing you is positive, it will require much more elaborate techniques, and the 
nature of governance will vary according to the purpose, objectives, and level of techniques 
available.  
All  things  being  equal,  negative  governance  involves  much  less  work  than  positive 
governance.
15 If you are more knowledgeable, physically robust, and resourceful, it is more 
difficult to govern you. Generally speaking, the freer she is, the harder it is to govern her, 
which paradoxically may mean that freedom potentially requires much more intervention on 
the part of the governor, and not less. Finally, if I want you to live in certain ways (that is, 
govern you positively), it is much more convenient (if possible) to persuade you of the wort h 
of living in that way, rather than threaten you, bribe you, and then constantly monitor you to 
see if you comply or not. Self-discipline, self-subjection, and self-governance are thus more 
efficient ways of governing people. Generally speaking, the strategy of governance, especially 
when it involves freedom as a technique of governance, is much more efficient when it relies 
on strategies of self-governance.  
Foucault defines ‘government’ as “the structure (ing) of the possible field of action of 
others”.
16 For the art of government that aims to govern positively, the end is not primarily to 
make rebellion impossible, but it has other positive aims – for example, the welfare of the 
population. Specific purposes can change, but there must be some positive purpose. The goal 
                                                           
15 Thus, for example, if Americans make war against Afghans or Iraqis (or any number of people they are at war 
with) just to make sure that there are no possible dangers to American hegemony (or internal security), then what 
it needs to do is to simply bomb its enemies and install regimes which are not hostile to it (irrespective of what 
those regimes positively believe in and how they will govern). On the other hand, if the purpose is not just 
negative but positive, that those regimes are democratic, capitalist, etc., it will require much more than just 
bombing;  it  will  involve  things  like  national  reconstruction,  educational  plans,  etc.  Obviously  the  latter 
necessitates much more work than the former.  
16 Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. 
Kritzman, 1988, 221. 6 
of positive governance is to manage things (including people) for specific ends. It requires a 
detailed  knowledge  of  the  governed  (the  people,  things,  and  territory,  etc.).  The  level  of 
knowledge (its type and complexity) required for a particular regime of governance will vary 
according  to  its  positive  telos.  Generally  speaking,  capitalism  can  be  differentiated  from 
negative  modes  of  governance,  whose  purpose  is  simply  to  ward  off  the  possibility  of 
rebellion (for example), irrespective of whether such a regime is a historical reality or simply 
a useful abstraction. Capitalism requires positive governance; even though the particular telos 
– how it defines itself (or understands and justifies itself) – may change, generally speaking a 
capitalist state cannot be understood as a minimal state that is simply interested in maintaining 
order and warding off any possible rebellion. A capitalist state is by definition not such a 
state, and cannot be such a state.
17 Every capitalist regime of governance has a positive telos, 
and in this it is like any other regime of governance with a positive telos. However, capitalism 
is  a specific regime of governance (differentiated from  other possible and actual positive 
regimes) due to the specificity of its telos. Furthermore, since a specific understanding of the 
positive telos of capitalism (within overall generality) has been changing throughout history, 
so its specific mode and strategies of governance have also been changing throughout history.  
The  positive  telos  of  capitalism  in  general  is  freedom.  The  freedom  here  is  to  be 
differentiated  from  freedom  in  the  minimal  sense,  in  which  it  is  the  condition  of  the 
possibility of all power relations; freedom is also the precondition of the modern capitalist 
form of economy (and lifestyle in general), but what differentiates capitalism in general from 
other positive regimes of governance is that freedom is its positive telos as well.
18 But that is 
not what is essential in Foucault’s analysis of capitalist modes of governance. For Foucault, 
the greatest insight is the discovery of what may be termed the double character of freedom – 
the discovery that freedom can simultaneously be the principle of maximisation as well as the 
principle of minimisation. In other words, freedom is not only the telos of the system as a 
whole,  it  is  also  the  principle  through  which  each  element  in  the  system  is  governed 
(managed) – the principle which, while achieving the positive telos, also makes sure that the 
system is governable in a way that does not reduce the positivity of the system as a whole. 
Freedom, within the capitalist mode of governance, is not the anti-thesis of government (and 
management); it is in fact the technology of government, in the sense of not only providing 
the condition of governance but also the way, the tool through which people (and things) are 
                                                           
17 What Patrick Carroll-Burke calls “premodern minimalist regime states” (see Patrick Carroll-Bruke, Material 
Designs: Engineering Cultures and Engineering States – Ireland 1650-1900, Theory and Society 31 (2002), 75-
114; here 105 and 114 n. 139).  
18 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 48-49. 7 
actually (positively) managed. The way to govern (manage) things is not to put limits on their 
circulation  but  to  increase  that  circulation  as  much  as  possible;  and  the  way  to  govern 
(manage) people is not to put limits on their desires,
19 their freedom, but let them do whatever 
they want as much as possible.
20 The very act of maximising freedom of circulation and 
fulfilment will in the end provide the best way of managing thin gs and people (as well). 
Hence  freedom  is  central  for  the  functioning  of  a  capitalist  system  not  only  as  the 
precondition  for  enhancing  utility  and  diversity,  but  also  for  imposing  singularity  on 
multiplicity.
21 Foucault’s claim is that in capitalism the governance of diversity is maintained 
through freedom itself, and not (primarily) through repression. Capitalism’s interests are not 
fulfilled by curbing and limitations per se. Capitalism has evolved as a system of government 
whose condition of operationalisation is freedom and immanence. Thus, from the fact that 
freedom is the telos of capitalism in general, it should not be construed that non-interference 
as such is also an essential characteristic of the capitalist modes of governance. Quite the 
contrary: In fact, as mentioned above, the more the people are free, the more the need for 
interference (in order to manage them). What differentiates capitalism from other regimes of 
governance  is  not  non-interference,  but  the  type  of  interference,  the  techniques  of 
interference, and how interference is justified. Again, speaking generally and schematically, 
capitalism justifies interference itself in the name of freedom, uses freedom as technique of 
interference, and makes sure that interference is efficient and minimally costly, and applied 
only as much as is absolutely necessary. In fact, one of the points Foucault makes in this 
regard is that capitalism has beguiled its critics (especially Marxist critics)
22 precisely because 
they erroneously thought that interference per se was essential to capitalism.
23 
This understanding of capitalism is at the heart of Foucault’s analysis from the start. The 
mutation that we see in the actual development of historical capitalism, as well as in Foucault 
own analysis, is internal to this understanding (and not the discovery of some new principle or 
some additional insight, as has been suggested sometimes). Thus, in Discipline and Punish he 
describes the purpose of disciplines in the following terms:  
 
Discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the force of 
the  body  (in  economic  terms  of  utility)  and  diminishes  these  same  forces  (in  political  terms  of 
obedience). In short, it dissociates power from body; on the one hand, it turns it onto an ‘aptitude’, a 
                                                           
19 Ibid., 72-73.  
20 Of course, within the general framework of the law and the rules of the game. 
21 Foucault, The Subject and Power, 221. 
22 Although, as I say below, Foucault was at the same time criticising some of his own earlier claims. 
23 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 120-122. 8 
‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power 
that might result from it, and turn it into a relation of strict subject.
24  
 
Disciplines, as “the ‘techniques for assuring the ordering of multiplicities” and enhancing 
governance, have the purpose of increasing “both the ‘docility’ and the ‘utility’ of all the 
elements of the system”.
25 But even at this stage Foucault is well aware that reduction of the 
body as “a ‘political’ force” is to be carried out “at the least cost”.
26 It is understood that 
Foucault studies the strategies of the accumulation of men (the political problem of subjection 
referred to in the quote above) as the function of the problem of governance, but what is 
seldom understood is that Foucault treats the problem of governance not in isolation but in 
relationship to the problem of the accumulation of capital. The problem is not just governance 
but  the  type  of  governance  that  provides  the  space  in  which  hindrances  to  capital 
accumulation
27 are the least, while its possibilities are being utilised to the maximum. Hence 
the problem is not just one of producing docile bodies, but one of producing docile bodies 
which are also useful. The purpose of producing docility is to maximise utility; docility that 
hampers utility is unacceptable.  
 It is true that Foucault partially retracts his earlier statement in  Discipline and Punish
28 
that the eighteenth century had “made such a strong demand for freedoms, had all the same 
ballasted  these  freedoms  with  a  disciplinary  technique  that  .  .  .  provided,  as  it  were, 
guarantees for the exercise of this freedom.”
29 Why did he retract the statement? At least for 
the following reasons: First, he now thought that he had to a certain extent wrongly opposed 
freedom and discipline. Freedom involves self-discipline, and the notion of freedom without 
conditions  presupposes  the  negative  conception  of  freedom  Foucault  was  now  trying  to 
overcome. In his critique of the repressive hypothesis he was also engaged in a self-criticism. 
Disciplines  are  the  necessary  condition  of  freedom.  Second,  he  now  realised  that  the 
conception of freedom employed within disciplinary techniques was restrictive, as it revolves 
around the figures of ‘prohibition’ and ‘norm’ – even if negatively. Foucault’s mistake at this 
                                                           
24 Ibid., 138. 
25 Ibid., 218. 
26 Ibid., 221. In addition, cost is to be primarily understood in terms of cost  to ‘utility’, ‘diversity’, and freedom, 
and not as cost of freedom (the latter is also a concern, but only secondarily). 
27 In the broad sense of  both human and ordinary ‘economic’ accumulation. The primordial relation between 
capital accumulation in the economic sense and capital accumulation in the political sense is not entirely clear at 
this stage in Foucault’s work. For a detailed analysis of this, see Ali Rizvi, Foucault and Capitalist Rationality: A 
Reconstruction, Market Forces 1, 4 (2006), 23-33. 
28 Foucault’s original statement occurs in Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 221-224. 
29 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 48.  9 
point was that he did not sufficiently realise the contingency of certain restrictive techniques 
employed within the overall political economy of capitalism at a particular time and space. 
Generally speaking what changed along the line were three interrelated things: a) The 
realisation that the former principles and ideals were either too restrictive (given the positive 
commitment to freedom) and/or are no longer necessary (and even might be detrimental in the 
long run) to the freedom of circulation. Some principles or restrictions were important at one 
stage (for example, for the creation of the subject of capital in the first place), but were no 
longer necessary once that object had been achieved to a certain minimal level. The latter is 
particularly  true  for  restrictive  disciplines  Foucault  studied  in  his  various  works,  but 
particularly in Discipline and Punish; b) changes in the epistemological stances about what 
can  be  known  about  people,  their  desires,  and  reality  at  large  (especially  the  economic 
reality).  The  discovery  of  the  epistemological  impossibility  of  knowing  the  object  of 
governance  completely  lays  bare  the  necessity  of  constant  dealing  with  uncertainties  and 
working with probabilities (though it is interpreted as positivity in the Kantian way, where the 
finitude is in fact the necessary condition of freedom); c) consequently, the model is now not 
the artificially constructed transparent reality but the messy reality, which we cannot ever 
know completely and hence are obliged to interact with on a continuous and precarious basis.  
The emergence of the new art of government in Europe from the seventeenth century 
onwards represented an advance in terms of the development of capitalism precisely because 
it  was  a  mode  of  governance  which  went  beyond  the  limiting  principle  of  governing 
negatively:
30 that is, governing basically to limit rebellion and transgression  – essentially on 
the model of letting live or taking life.
31 The newly emergent modes of governance were all 
aimed at positive governance; they had positive ends. But positivity is only part of the story, 
as positivity in itself does not make any regime a regime of capitalist governance. The 
Catholic Church ruled populations (and individuals) positively as well, but its positive end or 
principle of governance was guidance, not freedom.
32 The new arts of government, however, 
were further related to capitalism in that their positive principle of governance called for a 
substantial commitment to freedom. Mercantilism, cameralism, reasons of state, theory of 
police,  and  disciplinary  techniques  developed  by  great  administrative  states  (and 
governmental  regimes)  of  the eighteenth  century  all  involved  not  only  freedom  as  the 
justificatory principle of governance but also as a technique of power and governance. 
                                                           
30 Or governing properly at all, given the maxim that “the king reigns, but he does not govern” (Thiers’s famous 
phrase, quoted by Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 76). 
31 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 136ff. 
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However,  all  these  models  have  limits  from  the  perspective  of  capitalism,  as  they  limit 
freedom not only externally but also internally.  
The limiting principles are varied, and we cannot go into the details here, but an example 
is in order. With mercantilism, for example, the concern of governance is positive, and the 
aim  of  governance  is  productive  (for  example,  accumulation  of  wealth,  etc.).  Thus,  for 
example, mercantilism saw population as a source of wealth, as a productive force, etc.
33 But 
the mercantilist objective of accumulating wealth in order to build a strong state or make the 
country strong, puts limits on the accumulation of wealth (and the accumulation of men 
related to it), which is not an internal limit on capital but an external limit (the wealth is not 
accumulated for its own sake but in order to make a country strong; thus the primary purpose 
is not accumulation in itself, but to support the country or the k ing). Therefore, mercantilism 
as a system poses problems, in the long run, which for capitalism must be overcome, even 
though mercantilism provides an important phase (perhaps even necessary phase) in the 
development of capitalism in Europe. For Foucault,  “mercantilism was blocked and halted 
precisely because it took the sovereign’s might as its essential objective”. Within the overall 
paradigm of sovereignty, “the art of government could not develop in a specific autonomous 
way”.
34 Similarly, we can argue that although mercantilism provides a necessary
35 step in the 
emergence of capitalist modes of governance, it ultimately proves an obstacle to be overcome 
so that capitalist modes of governance can evolve in “a specific autonomous way”. According 
to Foucault’s genealogy this is precisely what happened at different levels, and progressively 
through the emergence of biopower and arts of government related to it.  
To recapitulate, the analysis of power in Foucault corresponds to the period in which 
capitalism  emerged  in  Europe  and  underwent  different  phases  in  its  development.  The 
transition from different forms of power – from juridico-legal, to disciplinary, to biopower – 
and the arts of governance related to them can be roughly matched with different phases in the 
development of capitalism: Nascent capitalism, imperialism, and late capitalism, etc. As we 
go from one phase to another, one constant theme that emerges is the lessening of repressive 
measures in the crude forms of prohibition and exclusion, and the corresponding expansion of 
freedom not only as a space of possibility for individuals and groups, but also as the main 
technique of power. Society moves from being that of repression to that of control.  
Several  provisos  are  in  order  here:  The  account  does  not  imply  that  in  societies  of 
‘repression’  and  ‘order’  freedom  is  not  important.  Not  at  all!  But  the  overall  emphasis 
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changes. Exclusion and prohibition do not go away, but they do not remain the model or the 
primary  technique  of  governance.  Conceptually  speaking,  the  primary  shift  occurs  in 
transition  from  negative,  minimal  regime  to  a  positive  regime  of  governance.  Not  every 
positive mode of governance is necessarily capitalist, but many techniques developed in an 
historically positive mode of governance will be found congenial to capitalist modes. Once 
the mode of governance shifts from governing negatively to positively, the conditions are 
minimally (but not deterministically) set for the emergence of capitalist modes of governance, 
in order to maximise utility and diversity in such a way that the system remains manageable 
as a whole. However, at the start, as is to be expected, such a task is beset with anxiety and set 
in an alien world; capitalism has to create a world in which it will be at home (and destroy 
those elements of the previous world in which it was not at home). Such a process requires 
oppression and exclusion; the process required to create a capitalist subjectivity from scratch, 
for  example,  cannot  be  understood  via  a  model  that  presupposes  the  idea  that  capitalist 
subjectivity is already a norm. The former surely would require more elaborate methods of 
observation, surveillance, and normative training than the latter. The general lesson which 
emerges  from  the  genealogy  is  that  capitalism  is  not  essentially  repressive;  its  positive 
principle is freedom not repression, inclusion not exclusion, maximisation not minimisation, 
diversity not singularity, etc., and the latter concepts are to be achieved through the former as 
much as possible. The proof for this, according to Foucault, is that capitalism was able to 
gradually lift restrictions that were no longer indispensible.  
Historically speaking, the shift from negative to positive modes of governance was at 
least partially due to changes in the logic and mechanisms of the new emerging economy 
itself. The freedom of movement and circulation inherent in the logic of capitalist economy 
soon created a scenario which outstripped the old mechanisms of power that presupposed 
closed walls and exclusion and simplistic repression. As Foucault writes: 
  
…. an important problem for towns in the eighteenth century was allowing for surveillance, since the 
suppression of city walls made necessary by economic development meant that one could no longer 
close towns in the evening or closely supervise daily comings and goings, so that the insecurity of the 
towns  was  increased  by  the  influx  of  the  floating  population  of  beggars,  vagrants,  delinquents, 
criminals, thieves, murderers, and so on, who might come, as everyone knows, from the country… In 
other words, it was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a 12 
division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the 
bad.
36 
 
In a sense, this encapsulates the whole problem of governance in the age of capitalism, which 
in  a  way  is  still  with  us.  The  example  of  a  town  here  is  important  for  several  reasons. 
Capitalism as a movement emerges in free towns, away from the shackles of early modern 
(feudal)  sovereign  territorial  states.  Foucault  at  one  point  says  that  “the  town  was  par 
excellence the free town”,
37 and that “the town was always an expansion within an essentially 
territorial system of power founded and developed on the basis of a territorial domination 
defined by feudalism”.
38 For a feudal territorial state the problem is entirely negative, that is, 
of “fixing and demarcating the territory”; the problem of the newly emerging, positive art of 
government on the other hand is: “(A)llowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, 
sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving 
around, continuously going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent 
dangers of this circulation are cancelled out”.
39 Governing open, fluid multiplicities without 
hindering the fluidity; in other words, managing the space of governance in such a way as to 
maximise  opportunity  and  minimise  dangers  (possible  disruptions  to  the  positive  task). 
Fluidity, openness, and inherent ungovernability are seen not just as dangers (conceptually 
speaking), but as opportunities. The task of the newly evolving arts of government (which of 
course would draw upon all the present and past available resources) is to evolve techniques, 
strategies, policies in order to do just that: “It is simply a matter of maximising the positive 
elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is 
risky  and  inconvenient,  like  theft  and  disease,  while  knowing  that  they  will  never  be 
completely suppressed”.
40 This last point is very important. Whence comes this realisation 
that ‘risk’ can only be ‘managed’ but never “completely suppressed”? I submit that this is (at 
least in part) due to the realisation of the role of freedom in the whole game. If the purpose is 
to maximise ‘opportunity’, ‘utility’, or ‘positivity’ (whatever you want to call it) then freedom 
is essential to the system as a whole; and, if freedom is essential, risk and uncertainty are also 
essential, as they are part and parcel of freedom. Risk cannot be abolished without abolishing 
freedom,  and  hence  the  system  itself.  It  also  follows  from  this  that  such  a  strategy  of 
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governance is primarily positive (as it is based on positivity par excellence – freedom) and 
only secondarily negative (aimed at reducing risk).  
It is clear that for the fluidity and openness described above in their nascent form, with 
reference to the eighteenth-century town, the disciplinary model is unsuitable in the long run. 
The disciplinary model has two aspects to it: a) On the one hand it is the model for the 
creation and sustenance of the capitalist subjectivity; b) on the other hand it is also a model 
for managing capitalist spaces. The model has problems at both levels. The first problem is to 
do with the domain with which it deals. Generally speaking, the disciplinary model is the 
model  of  individuation.
41  With  the emergence  of  new objects  of  concern for  capitalist 
governance – for example, the phenomenon of population – the model of individuation is 
naturally inadequate because population is conceived not as the sum total of individuals,
42 but 
as a quasi-natural phenomenon with its own norms and laws, which are to be studied in their 
own right and cannot be arrived at through knowing the multiplicity of individuals comprising 
the population. Hence, a separate set of techniques, knowledge, and methods is needed to 
govern population. So, at this stage, we have modes of governing individuals (modes of 
individuation) and discourses related to them on the one hand, for which th e disciplinary 
model still remains a model, while on the other hand, there is a new domain of objects and 
discourses  emerging  relating  to  this  new  domain  of  objects  (population  and  related 
phenomena).
43 This will slowly lead to the development of a new set of knowledges and new 
modes of governance (Foucault tentatively calls the regime that of security, but the name here 
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to combine these two by basically hypothesising that the two regimes of governance are indeed complementary, 
but also that the techniques developed related to biopolitics and insights resulting from them are in turn used to 
‘reform’ the disciplinary model (which as a consequence does not remain ‘disciplinary’ in the strict restrictive 
sense of its ‘original’ meaning). I also emphasise that lessening of disciplines is the result of the maturity of 
capitalism itself. Space constraints mean I have to leave the elaboration of this interesting discussion for another 
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is not important). The phenomenon of sex, at least at the initial stages, will provide the link
44 
between the modes of individuation and the modes of massification (or socialisation).
45  
On the second level, even on the plane of individuation it is realised that the disciplinary 
model, if not entirely obsolete, is inadequate in various ways, even in its own domain. To start 
with, once capitalist society has matured and capitalist subjectivity has become a norm, the 
techniques related to the early stages of capitalism for the creation and sustenance of capitalist 
individuality are no longer necessary. The limitations  – training regimes associated with the 
early  disciplinary  model  –  are  now  seen  as  excessive  given  the  guiding  principle  that 
repression,  exclusion,  etc.  are  permissible  only  as  long  as  they  are  absolutely  necessary. 
Hence, many of those harsh and imposing procedures can just fade away. It is also necessary 
to get rid of those procedures that have become a hindrance to the development of a fully-
fledged, creative, and innovative capitalist individuality by enforcing unnecessary limits, or 
even by not providing maximal opportunities without any unnecessary limits. Moreover, the 
newly emerging discourses related to population governance techniques would also lay bare 
the inherent incompatibility of the internal logic of the disciplinary regime with the freedom 
of development and circulation ideally needed for a regime committed to the maximisation of 
freedom.  Foucault  in  this  context  talks  at  length  about  disciplinary  techniques  and  their 
inherent limitations, and contrasts them with the mode of governance related to population 
discourses and the security regime evolving in the wake of it.
46 From an epistemological 
perspective, the disciplinary model, to start with, is built on the idea of static, artificially 
constructed  space(s),
47  which  can  be  completely  circumvented,  and  hence  completely 
regulated.
48 The completeness principle is quite contrary to the very nature of freedom (not 
essence – i.e. the minimal materiality inherent in the concept); it is not only impossible in the 
long run, it is also undesirable.  It is deemed impossible once it is realised that the early 
modern  dreams  of  conquering  nature  completely,  and  hence  abolishing  its  arbitrariness 
entirely,  are  chimerical.  Nature  remains,  and  even  though  we  can  tame  it,  we  can  never 
overcome it entirely. Human society cannot be built on and cannot be understood using the 
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46 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 18-49. 
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Territory, Population, 19). 
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model of artificiality, completeness, and absence of arbitrariness. One has to work with the 
amalgam of artificiality and naturalness (and hence the inevitability of arbitrariness and risk). 
But it is also undesirable given that the fulfilment of the dream of completeness will rob 
the system of its very core, i.e. freedom. Disciplines aim to annul reality, while the new art of 
government deals with the historical reality and works within (and with) it. The aim is not to 
control everything, know everything, and guide everything, but to work with an impartial, 
incomplete, probable understanding of things, let things be, and guide them, regulate them, 
and manage them only to the extent that it is absolutely necessary. Again, the argument is that 
it  is  not  possible  to  know  everything,  but  also  in  the  wake  of  new  discourses  related  to 
population studies (probability, statistics, etc.), it is discovered that things can be managed 
without  having  exact  and  complete  knowledge  of  them  (only  if  one  abandons  the 
completeness myth of complete knowledge, and complete control). It is discovered that one 
can  work  with  probabilities  and  manage  things,  and  that  one  can  reduce  risks  (and  live 
happily with them) without eradicating them. Beyond the epistemological point, it is also 
realised that it is undesirable to know everything, to manage things completely, to eradicate 
risks completely, to guide things in complete and full detail (even if for the maximisation of 
utility) because it is against the principle of freedom, the core principle of the system. 
Finally, although the disciplinary paradigm is not essentially negative in the sense that 
the legal paradigm is, like the legal paradigm it is ‘codificatory’, as it tells us what must be 
done at each and every moment. This is limiting and negative: It is limiting in the sense that 
everything is laid down in advance – it leaves no room for creativity and imagination. It limits 
essential  freedom.  It  is  also  negative  in  the  more  mundane  sense  that,  since  it  guides 
everything in minute detail, what it does not give direct guidance about is prohibited.
49 New 
arts of government, on the other hand, are more open -ended, and provide room for freedom: 
Unlike the legal code or the disciplinary model they provide detailed guidance for action. 
Within the general legal framework and the rules of the game, things a re left to their own 
devices as much as possible. The technique of governance ‘stands back sufficiently’ and lets 
reality unfold as much as possible without harming or risking the system as a whole.
50 In the 
new regime of government freedom, the idea of the  government of man does not primarily 
revolve around what one should do and what one should not do, or what are the correct ways 
of actions one should choose, but primarily on “before all else the man’s freedom” of “what 
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they  do,  of  what  they  have  an  interest  in  doing…”
51  The  government  of  man  requires 
freedom: 
 
… not only as the right of individuals legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses of 
the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensable to governmentality 
itself. Henceforth, a condition of governing well is that freedom, or certain forms of freedom, are 
really respected. Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is 
above all ignorance of how to govern properly. The integration of freedom, and the specific limits to 
this freedom within the field of governmental practice has now become an imperative.
52 
 
The positive character of new modes of governance can be explored with reference to the 
concept  of  ‘desire’.  The  sovereign  (for  example)  “is  the  person  who  can  say  no  to  any 
individual’s desire”.
53 The starting point of the new arts of governance is not saying ‘no’, but 
saying ‘yes’. And the problematic is ‘how’, and not whether ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (which is of course 
‘yes’) – how to promote the desires of each and every individual in such a way as to maximise 
desire-satisfaction of the population as a whole in a way that is compatible with the reduction 
of pain (including any disruption to the system). The way is to make desire maximisation 
itself the principle of governance. Desire is the source of action. One can do nothing against 
desire. It is futile to suppress desire. This is still negative. What makes it positive is the 
assertion that it is a good thing to fulfil desires. 
54 Hence the importance of utilitarianism, not 
just as the principle that legitimises the pursuit of desires, but also  as a technique of 
government.  Here we can clearly see the distinction between disciplinary governance and 
biopolitics even at the level of individuals. Disciplinary techniques, unlike sovereignty or the 
legal model, of course, do not say ‘no’ to desires, but, being techniques of detail,
55 they 
ideally rely on (and aspire to) knowing the reality of each and every desire and decoding them 
to  make  sure  –  not  suppressing,  but  discriminating  between  good  and  bad  desires,  and 
providing ultimate guidance as to which desires should be pursued (as congenial to utility 
maximisation),  and  which  desires  should  not  be  followed  (as  detrimental  to  utility 
maximisation). Such a model would require detailed, constant surveillance, which was the 
hallmark  of  the  panopticonic  utopias,  early  psychiatric  models,  and  policies  regarding 
schools, factories,  and  family life during the eighteenth  century. This  is  both undesirable 
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(being too costly and ultimately detrimental to the very freedom one is yearning for), and 
impossible. It is undesirable, and, in the end, futile to micro-manage desires.  
The model of security, on the other hand, manages desires on the macro level, providing 
space for desires to flourish and bloom (even spurring them on). People will be incited to 
discourse  about  their  desires  (sexual  discourses  for  example);
56  on the other hand, those 
desires are managed from a distance of anonymity  – it is not this or that desire which is 
important,  not  your  or  my  desire,  but  the  general  mechanism  and  the  logic  of  desire. 
Knowledge of individual desire allows management of desire from a distance, culminating in 
the interests of the population. It is realised that “this desire is such that if one give it ‘free 
play,’ it will lead to the general interest of the population”. 
57 The technique of government no 
longer concerns itself with the desire of each and every individual, but with what is desirable 
for  the  population  as  a  whole.  Policy  initiatives  concentrate  on  making  sure  that  these 
interests are served and maximised, and if they have to intervene in the individual life (which 
will be not infrequently of course), that it will be in the name of safeguarding the interests of 
the population based on discourses and expertise developed in the area, and not in the name of 
guiding  the  individual  in  her  private  life.  Managing  desires  from  the  distance  of  interest 
provides a better model of desirability, efficiency, and feasibility. This should all ideally lead 
to a reformulation of disciplinary techniques according to the new model of population and 
security discourses.  
It is worth repeating that legal and disciplinary paradigms do not totally go away. First, 
legal and disciplinary paradigms are historically the conditions of the possibility of new arts 
of government. Second, they are part of the new system, even though no more as paradigms 
of the way the system is governed. Third, they can still be applied to the fringes of a capitalist 
society where capitalist values have not yet penetrated or become norms. 
To conclude, what has emerged from this brief and admittedly very schematic overview 
of transition from pre-capitalist mode of governance to capitalist modes of governance, and 
then the mutations and evolution of various modes of governance within capitalism itself, is 
that freedom and control, freedom and management are two sides of the same coin, and one 
cannot understand the capitalist modes of governance by pitting freedom and control against 
each other, which ultimately presupposes a simplistic concept of freedom as a way out, and 
power as domination. In fact, there is a much more complex interplay of freedom and power 
on the one hand, and freedom and government on the other. The complexity and ingenuity of 
capitalist modes of governance cannot be challenged based on simplistic models of repression 
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versus liberation and the notion of freedom as a ‘way out’, but rather requires “a patient 
labour giving form to our impatience for liberty”.
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